Fifty years sooner
or later can make little difference in the case of a book so
revolutionary as this. It saw the light when a so-called revolutionary
movement was preparing in men's minds which agitation was, however,
only a disturbance due to desires to participate in government,
and to govern and to be governed, in a manner different to that
which prevails. The "revolutionists" of 1848 were bewitched
with an idea. They were not at all the masters of ideas. Most
of those who since that time have prided themselves upon being
revolutionists have been and are likewise but the bondmen of an
idea, -- that of the different lodgment of authority.
The temptation is, of course, present
to attempt an explanation of the central thought of this work;
but such an effort appears to be unnecessary to one who has the
volume in his hand. The author's care in illustrating his meaning
shows that he realized how prone the possessed man is to misunderstand
whatever is not moulded according to the fashions in thinking.
The author's learning was considerable, his command of words and
ideas may never be excelled by another, and he judged it needful
to develop his argument in manifold ways. So those who enter into
the spirit of it will scarcely hope to impress others with the
same conclusion in a more summary manner. Or, if one might deem
that possible after reading Stirner, still one cannot think that
it could be done so surely. The author has made certain work of
it, even though he has to wait for his public; but still, the
reception of the book by its critics amply proves the truth of
the saying that one can give another arguments, but not under-
standing. The system-makers and system-believers
thus far cannot get it out of their heads that any discourse about
the nature of an ego must turn upon the common characteristics
of egos, to make a systematic scheme of what they share as a generality.
The critics inquire what kind of man the author is talking about.
They repeat the question: What does he believe in? They fail to
grasp the purport of the recorded answer: "I believe in myself";
which is attributed to a common soldier long before the time of
Stirner. They ask, what is the principle of the self-conscious
egoist, the Einzige? To this perplexity Stirner says: Change the
question; put "who?" instead of "what?" and
an answer can then be given by naming him!
This, of course, is too simple for
persons governed by ideas, and for persons in quest of new governing
ideas. They wish to classify the man. Now, that in me which you
can classify is not my distinguishing self. "Man" is
the horizon or zero of my existence as an individual. Over that
I rise as I can. At least I am something more than "man in
general." Pre-existing worship of ideals and disrespect for
self had made of the ego at the very most a Somebody, oftener
an empty vessel to be filled with the grace or the leavings of
a tyrannous doctrine; thus a Nobody. Stirner dispels the morbid
subjection, and recognizes each one who knows and feels himself
as his own property to be neither humble Nobody nor befogged Somebody,
but henceforth flat-footed and level-headed Mr. Thisbody, who
has a character and good pleasure of his own, just as he has a
name of his own. The critics who attacked this work and were answered
in the author's minor writings, rescued from oblivion by John
Henry Mackay, nearly all display the most astonishing triviality
and impotent malice.
We owe to Dr. Eduard von Hartmann
the unquestionable service which he rendered by directing attention
to this book in his "Philosophie des Unbewußten,"
the first edition of which was published in 1869, and in other
writings. I do not begrudge Dr. von Hartmann the liberty of criticism
which he used; and I
think the admirers of Stirner's teaching must quite appreciate
one thing which Von Hartmann did at a much later date. In "Der
Eigene" of August 10, 1896, there appeared a letter written
by him and giving, among other things, certain data from which
to judge that, when Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his later essays,
Nietzsche was not ignorant of Stirner's book.
Von Hartmann wishes that Stirner
had gone on and developed his principle. Von Hartmann suggests
that you and I are really the same spirit, looking out through
two pairs of eyes. Then, one may reply, I need not concern myself
about you, for in myself I have -- us; and at that rate Von Hartmann
is merely accusing himself of inconsistency: for, when Stirner
wrote this book, Von Hartmann's spirit was writing it; and it
is just the pity that Von Hartmann in his present form does not
indorse what he said in the form of Stirner, -- that Stirner was
different from any other man; that his ego was not Fichte's transcendental
generality, but "this transitory ego of flesh and blood."
It is not as a generality that you and I differ, but as a couple
of facts which are not to be reasoned into one. "I"
is somewise Hartmann, and thus Hartmann is "I"; but
I am not Hartmann, and Hartmann is not -- I. Neither am I the
"I" of Stirner; only Stirner himself was Stirner's "I."
Note how comparatively indifferent a matter it is with Stirner
that one is an ego, but how all-important it is that one be a
self-conscious ego, -- a self-conscious, self-willed person.
Those not self-conscious and self-willed
are constantly acting from self-interested motives, but clothing
these in various garbs. Watch those people closely in the light
of Stirner's teaching, and they seem to be hypocrites, they have
so many good moral and religious plans of which self-interest
is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe, do not know
that this is more than a coincidence.
In Stirner we have the philosophical
foundation for political liberty. His interest in the practical
development of egoism to the dissolution of the State and the
union of free men is clear
and pronounced, and harmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy
of Josiah Warren. Allowing for difference of temperament and language,
there is a substantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon.
Each would be free, and sees in every increase of the number of
free people and their intelligence an auxiliary force against
the oppressor. But, on the other hand, will any one for a moment
seriously contend that Nietzsche and Proudhon march together in
general aim and tendency, -- that they have anything in common
except the daring to profane the shrine and sepulchre of superstition?
Nietzsche has been much spoken of
as a disciple of Stirner, and, owing to favorable cullings from
Nietzsche's writings, it has occurred that one of his books has
been supposed to contain more sense than it really does -- so
long as one had read only the extracts.
Nietzsche cites scores or hundreds
of authors. Had he read everything, and not read Stirner?
But Nietzsche is as unlike Stirner
as a tight-rope performance is unlike an algebraic equation.
Stirner loved liberty for himself,
and loved to see any and all men and women taking liberty, and
he had no lust of power. Democracy to him was sham liberty, egoism
the genuine liberty.
Nietzsche, on the contrary, pours
out his contempt upon democracy because it is not aristocratic.
He is predatory to the point of demanding that those who must
succumb to feline rapacity shall be taught to submit with resignation.
When he speaks of "Anarchistic dogs" scouring the streets
of great civilized cities; it is true, the context shows that
he means the Communists; but his worship of Napoleon, his bathos
of anxiety for the rise of an aristocracy that shall rule Europe
for thousands of years, his idea of treating women in the oriental
fashion, show that Nietzsche has struck out in a very old path
-- doing the apotheosis of tyranny. We individual egoistic Anarchists,
however, may say to the Nietzsche school, so as not to be misunderstood:
We do not ask of the Napoleons to have pity, nor of the
predatory barons to do justice. They will find it convenient for
their own welfare to make terms with men who have learned of Stirner
what a man can be who worships nothing, bears allegiance to nothing.
To Nietzsche's rhodomontade of eagles in baronial form, born to
prey on industrial lambs, we rather tauntingly oppose the ironical
question: Where are your claws? What if the "eagles"
are found to be plain barn-yard fowls on which more silly fowls
have fastened steel spurs to hack the victims, who, however, have
the power to disarm the sham "eagles" between two suns?
Stirner shows that men make their tyrants as they make their gods,
and his purpose is to unmake tyrants.
Nietzsche dearly loves a tyrant.
In style Stirner's work offers the
greatest possible contrast to the puerile, padded phraseology
of Nietzsche's "Zarathustra" and its false imagery.
Who ever imagined such an unnatural conjuncture as an eagle "toting"
a serpent in friendship? which performance is told of in bare
words, but nothing comes of it. In Stirner we are treated to an
enlivening and earnest discussion addressed to serious minds,
and every reader feels that the word is to him, for his instruction
and benefit, so far as he has mental independence and courage
to take it and use it. The startling intrepidity of this book
is infused with a whole-hearted love for all mankind, as evidenced
by the fact that the author shows not one iota of prejudice or
any idea of division of men into ranks. He would lay aside government,
but would establish any regulation deemed convenient, and for
this only our convenience in consulted. Thus there will be general
liberty only when the disposition toward tyranny is met by intelligent
opposition that will no longer submit to such a rule. Beyond this
the manly sympathy and philosophical bent of Stirner are such
that rulership appears by contrast a vanity, an infatuation of
perverted pride. We know not whether we more admire our author
or more love him.
Stirner's attitude toward woman
is not special. She is an individual if she can be, not handicapped by anything he says, feels,
thinks, or plans. This was more fully exemplified in his life
than even in this book; but there is not a line in the book to
put or keep woman in an inferior position to man, neither is there
anything of caste or aristocracy in the book. Likewise there is
nothing of obscurantism or affected mysticism about it. Everything
in it is made as plain as the author could make it. He who does
not so is not Stirner's disciple nor successor nor co-worker.
Some one may ask: How does plumb-line Anarchism train with the
unbridled egoism proclaimed by Stirner? The plumb-line is not
a fetish, but an intellectual conviction, and egoism is a universal
fact of animal life. Nothing could seem clearer to my mind than
that the reality of egoism must first come into the consciousness
of men, before we can have the unbiased Einzige in place of the
prejudiced biped who lends himself to the support of tyrannies
a million times stronger over me than the natural self-interest
of any individual. When plumb-line doctrine is misconceived as
duty between unequal-minded men, -- as a religion of humanity,
-- it is indeed the confusion of trying to read without knowing
the alphabet and of putting philanthropy in place of contract.
But, if the plumb-line be scientific, it is or can be my possession,
my property, and I choose it for its use -- when circumstances
admit of its use. I do not feel bound to use it because it is
scientific, in building my house; but, as my will, to be intelligent,
is not to be merely wilful, the adoption of the plumb-line follows
the discarding of incantations. There is no plumb-line without
the unvarying lead at the end of the line; not a fluttering bird
or a clawing cat.
On the practical side of the question
of egoism versus self-surrender and for a trial of egoism in politics,
this may be said: the belief that men not moved by a sense of
duty will be unkind or unjust to others is but an indirect confession
that those who hold that belief are greatly interested in having
others live for them rather than for themselves. But I do not
ask or expect so much.
I am content if others individually live for themselves, and thus
cease in so many ways to act in opposition to my living for myself,
-- to our living for ourselves.
If Christianity has failed to turn
the world from evil, it is not to be dreamed that rationalism
of a pious moral stamp will succeed in the same task. Christianity,
or all philanthropic love, is tested in non-resistance. It is
a dream that example will change the hearts of rulers, tyrants,
mobs. If the extremest self-surrender fails, how can a mixture
of Christian love and worldly caution succeed? This at least must
be given up. The policy of Christ and Tolstoi can soon be tested,
but Tolstoi's belief is not satisfied with a present test and
failure. He has the infatuation of one who persists because this
ought to be. The egoist who thinks "I should like this to
be" still has the sense to perceive that it is not accomplished
by the fact of some believing and submitting, inasmuch as others
are alert to prey upon the unresisting. The Pharaohs we have ever
with us.
Several passages in this most remarkable
book show the author as a man full of sympathy. When we reflect
upon his deliberately expressed opinions and sentiments, -- his
spurning of the sense of moral obligation as the last form of
superstition, -- may we not be warranted in thinking that the
total disappearance of the sentimental supposition of duty liberates
a quantity of nervous energy for the purest generosity and clarifies
the intellect for the more discriminating choice of objects of
merit?
J. L. WALKER.